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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
CAPITOL HILL NEIGHBORHOOD 
COUNCIL INC., A Nonprofit ; 
Corporation AND 
KEITH AND DEBBIE WIDDISON, ] 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
JOHN PURDUE, 
De fendant/Appe11ant. ; 
i BRIEF OF 
i Case No. 
i Priority 
APPELLEES 
910206 
No. 16 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
Beth Purdue's motion to set aside the default judgment granted 
against John Purdue. Rulings on a motion for relief from a 
judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 
Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting 
Beth Purdue and Capitol Hill's motions to correct clerical 
errors. Orders to correct clerical errors are reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard. State of Utah v. Moya, 815 P.2d 
1312 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONTROLLING RULES 
See addendum for complete text of Rule 60, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs/Appellees Capitol Hill Neighborhood Council, Inc. 
and Keith and Debbie Widdison ("Capitol Hill") brought this 
action for damages and injunctive relief to abate a nuisance, an 
abandoned building known as Bob's Motel Annex, being maintained 
on de fendant John Purdue's (MPurdue") property.[R•2-17] Purdue 
answered the complaint, admitted ownership of the property, but 
denied it was a nuisance.[R.19-31] Purdue attended a pretrial 
conference on November 14, 1990.[R.44-47] Purdue then failed to 
appear at the final pretrial conference which had been properly 
scheduled and noticed for January 3, 1991.[R.46-47] On January 
31, 1991, a default judgment was entered against Purdue for his 
failure to appear. The default judgment mistakenly named Beth 
Purdue as a co-defendant.[R.48, 58-64] On February 5, 1991, Beth 
Purdue filed a motion to remove herself from the default judgment 
and to set aside the judgment against John Purdue.[R.65-68] On 
April 11, 1991, Capitol Hill filed a motion to correct clerical 
errors, namely the erroneous addition of Beth Purdue as a 
defendant and the incomplete description of the property at 
2 
issue, pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.[R.71-73] At a hearing on April 22, 1991, Capitol 
Hill's motion was granted and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment were amended to remove all references to Beth 
Purdue and to clarify the address of the property at issue.[R.74] 
Beth Purdue's motion to remove her name from the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment was granted. Her motion 
for a new trial and to set aside the judgment against John Purdue 
was denied. 
John and Beth Purdue filed a notice of appeal on April 29, 
1991, from the District Court's bench ruling of April 22, 
1991.[R.80-81] The order formalizing this bench ruling was 
entered on May 15, 1991.[R.87-88] 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
John Purdue is the owner of Bob's Motel Annex in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The Annex is located at the rear of a lot at 534 
North 300 West and is adjacent to Artie Court. This building is 
deteriorated and dangerous in the following respects: 
a. the building was vacant, open and unsecured, and is 
now abandoned and boarded; 
b. the building is a harbor for vagrants and vandals; 
c. the building is in violation of various building 
3 
codes. 
On March 30, 1989, the Salt Lake Department of Building and 
Housing Services issued a Notice and Order to John Purdue. The 
Notice and Order stated that the building was substandard and 
dangerous, and declared the building a public nuisance requiring 
abatement by repair or demolition. The Notice and Order further 
declared that this vacant abandoned structure constituted an 
attractive nuisance and served as a blight and a danger to the 
neighborhood, in violation of Section 202 of the Uniform Housing 
Code, and Section 302 of the Uniform Code for the Abatement of 
Dangerous Buildings, both adopted by Salt Lake City in Salt Lake 
City Ordinance §18.48.010. John Purdue failed to obey the Notice 
and Order and neither repaired nor demolished the building in 
question. 
Widdisons are adjacent property owners. Capitol Hill 
Neighborhood Council Inc. is a non-profit corporation concerned 
about the quality of life in the Capitol Hill neighborhood of 
Salt Lake City. Capitol Hill and Widdisons sought an order of 
the court requiring the demolition of Bob's Motel Annex and/or 
money damages for the nuisance it presented to the neighborhood. 
The default judgment of January 31, 1991, ordered the demolition 
of the Annex. [R.78] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Beth Purdue's motion to set aside the default judgment granted 
against John Purdue. Beth Purdue's attempts at intervention were 
untimely and without merit except to delete her as an erroneously 
named defendant. 
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
Capitol Hill and Beth Purdue's motions to correct clerical errors 
in the original judgment. The changes corrected the improper 
addition of Beth Purdue as a defendant and clarified the location 
of the building in question. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
BETH PURDUE'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
AND TO "INTERVENE" 
A. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY ENTERED 
AGAINST JOHN PURDUE 
A default judgment was entered against John and Beth Purdue 
on January 31, 1991. Beth Purdue, John Purdue's wife, filed a 
motion to set that judgment aside on February 5, 1991.[R.65-68] 
The proper standard of review for such motions is an abuse of 
discretion standard. "The trial court is afforded broad 
discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment. . . 
5 
and its determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion." Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989). 
Beth Purdue filed her motion to set aside the default 
judgment on the ground that she was named as a defendant in the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, and the Notice 
of Judgment, but had not been named in or served with the 
original complaint. Beth Purdue was correct in that she was not 
a party to the lawsuit and should not have been included in the 
judgment. This error was conceded by Capitol Hill and was the 
basis for its Rule 60(a) motion. This motion, which concurred 
with part of Beth Purdue's motion, was granted. The other 
aspects of Beth Purdue's motion, to set aside the default 
judgment against John Purdue or for a new trial, were denied. 
Other than the part of the motion concerning her improper 
inclusion, her motion was apparently an attempted intervention in 
this suit. 
A trial court has the authority to grant a default judgment 
as a sanction for failure to appear at a pre-trial conference. 
Rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes 
sanctions as provided in Rule 37, U. R. Civ. P., for failure to 
appear at a scheduling or pretrial conference. Rule 16(d) states 
6 
If a party or a party's attorney fails to 
obey a scheduling or pretrial order, if no 
appearance is made on behalf of a party at a 
scheduling or pretrial conference, if a party 
or a party's attorney is substantially 
unprepared to participate in the conference, 
or if a party or a party's attorney fails to 
participate in good faith, the court, upon 
motion or its own initiative, may make such 
orders with regard thereto as are just, and 
among others, any of the orders provided in 
Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D)(emphasis added). 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that "an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying 
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the 
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment 
by default against the disobedient party;M are proper sanctions 
(emphasis added). 
The standard for a review of sanctions imposed for failure 
to appear is an abuse of discretion standard. See, Schoney v. 
Memorial Estates, 790 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1990) (Trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in entering default judgment as a 
sanction for failure to fulfill discovery obligations). 
In W.W. & W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 
568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1977), the Supreme Court of Utah stated 
that "[u]nder Rule 37(d) sanctions are justified without 
reference to whether the unexcused failure to make discovery was 
7 
willful. The sanction of default judgment is justified where 
there has been a frustration of the judicial procedure, ...." 
See also, Darrinoton v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1991) and 
Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
Because Rule 16(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure concerning 
sanctions contains the exact text of Rule 16(F) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, federal case law is useful. As is true 
under the Utah rule, the federal rule allows the court, upon 
motion or on its own initiative, to enter an order of default 
judgment when a party or their attorney fails to appear at a 
scheduled conference or hearing. 
For example, a United States Bankruptcy Court in In Re 
McDowell, 33 BR 323 (ND Ohio 1983), affirmed an order of default 
judgment as a sanction for failure to appear at a duly scheduled 
pre-trial conference. 
Other state courts have reached similar conclusions. In 
Beal v. Rent-A-Center of America, 771 P.2d 553, 555 (Kansas App. 
1989), the court stated that "although dismissal is a severe and 
harsh action, it remains a very effective method of maintaining 
docket control and serves as a reminder that . . . pretrial 
conferences cannot be ignored with impunity." In Beal, the 
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court held that the trial court had the authority to dismiss the 
action where the plaintiff refused to answer interrogatories and 
to attend a pretrial conference. 
In the present case, the trial court was within its 
authority in granting a default judgment after Purdue was 
notified of the January 3, 1991, pretrial and failed to appear. 
[R.46-7] The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly allow such a 
remedy. 
B. BETH PURDUE'S "MOTION TO INTERVENE" WAS PROPERLY DENIED 
Beth Purdue first asserted an interest in this proceeding as a 
part of her motion filed on February 5, 1991. This motion was 
granted in part and denied in part and resulted in the 
corrections of clerical errors which relieved her of any 
liability and in effect granted her motion to set aside the 
default judgment as to her. In other respects, asking the trial 
court to set aside the default judgment as to her husband or 
asking for a new trial was essentially a motion to intervene. 
This attempt to intervene and obtain additional relief was 
untimely and improper. 
The right to intervene under Rule 24(a), U. R. Civ. P. is 
not absolute, but is subject to the requirement that the 
application for intervention be timely. Jenner v. Real Estate 
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Services, 659 P.2d 1072, 1073, 1074 (Utah 1983). Intervention is 
not permitted after entry of judgment unless there is a strong 
showing of entitlement and such unusual or compelling 
circumstances as will justify failure to intervene earlier. The 
timeliness of the application should be determined under the 
facts and circumstances of each particular case, and is in the 
sound discretion of the court." Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 
774 P.2d 1130, 1131 (Utah 1989) citing Jenner, 659 P.2d 1072, 
1073-74. See also. Interstate Land Corporation v. Patterson, 797 
P.2d 1101 (Utah App. 1990). 
In Jenner, the Utah Supreme Court denied a real estate 
partner's motion to intervene filed eleven days after entry of a 
default judgment. The court held the intervener had no standing 
to assert his interest because: (1) he had chosen to remain 
undisclosed as a partner; (2) he had permitted his partner to 
assume a role of sole owner of their interest in the property; 
and (3) notice of the suit to the defendant operated as notice to 
the partnership and the intervener. Id. at 1074. In this case, 
Beth Purdue did not attempt to intervene until after the entry of 
the default judgment. The same analysis should result in denial 
of her motions. 
John Purdue, in Paragraph 3 of his Answer to Amended 
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Complaint, stated that he was the owner of Bob's Motel Annex at 
535 North Arctic Court. [R.20-21] And at no time during 
discovery did John Purdue or Beth Purdue make any claim as to her 
alleged interest in the property. She therefore lacks standing 
to assert her interest after entry of the default judgment. 
Even if Beth Purdue had asserted a right to intervention in 
a timely manner the motion would have properly been denied as she 
has no interest in the subject property. Throughout this suit, 
the subject property has been referred to as Bob's Motel Annex. 
Admittedly, there has been some confusion as to the exact mailing 
address. But there has been no doubt as to which structure is 
and has been the subject of this suit, ie; Bob's Motel Annex. 
That building is owned solely by John Purdue, as he has admitted. 
Beth Purdue does not have a "marital" interest in the 
subject property. In 1975 the Utah Legislature abolished the 
estates of dower and curtsey as part of Utah's adoption of the 
Uniform Probate Code. Utah Code § 75-2-113. In its place, the 
Legislature enacted Utah Code § 75-2-201 and 202 which provide a 
surviving spouse with a 1/3 elective share of the deceased's 
augmented estate. Since the elective share is limited to 
property owned at the time of the spouse's death, it does not 
create an inchoate property interest similar to the common law 
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dower interest. 25 Am. Jur. 2d Dower and Curtsey § 40 (1966). 
The surviving spouse receives his or her share similar to an 
intestate distributee, unlike the dower interest where the widow 
took not as an heir, but in her own right. In re Bullen's 
Estate. 152 P. 533, 535 (Utah 1915). The trial court properly 
denied any intervention in this suit on the part of Beth Purdue, 
other than removing her as an improperly named defendant. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ALLOWING CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS IN THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, JUDGMENT AND NOTICE OF 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. 
Rule 60(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, permits the 
correction of clerical errors in judgments or orders upon motion 
by a party or by the court. In this case the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Notice of Entry of Judgment 
were incorrect in that Beth Purdue was inadvertently included in 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Notice of 
Entry of Judgment. The corrections made through the Rule 60(a) 
motion related to the removal of Beth Purdue's name and 
subsequent number and gender changes and clarifications of the 
exact location of the building in question. These corrections 
were purely clerical in nature and have no bearing on the merits 
of this case, or this appeal. The Utah Court of Appeals in State 
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of Utah v. Mova, 815 P.2d 1312, 1317 (Utah App. 1991) stated 
that Rule 60(a) orders are reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. 
This Court has stated, quoting Corpus Juris, that a clerical 
error "exists when without evident intention one word is written 
for another, . . . or when there are mistakes in proper names or 
amounts made in copying but which do not change the general sense 
of a record:". Frost v. District Court of First Judicial 
District In and For Box Elder County, 83 P.2d 737, 739 (Utah 
1938)(emphasis added). More recently this Court held that "[a] 
clerical error is one made in recording a judgment that results 
in the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the actual 
intention of the court. On the other hand, a judicial error is 
one made in rendering the judgment and results in a substantively 
incorrect judgment." Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Indus. Com'n., 770 
P.2d 125 (Utah 1989). In the present case, the trial court 
entered a default judgment against John Purdue. Through a 
mistake, Beth Purdue was named in the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Notice of Entry of Judgment. 
This error was corrected after Beth Purdue drew this to the 
Court's attention and was concurred in by Capitol Hill's Rule 
60(a) motion. This was a mistake in proper names, a clerical 
13 
error that had no bearing on the court's intention: to order the 
demolition of Bob's Motel Annex. The only other correction that 
was made related to the clarification of the address of the 
property in question, Bob's Motel Annex. As noted above, both 
the original and the amended judgment related to the same 
building. There was no change of substance at issue in the Rule 
60(a) motion, therefore the trial court was within its discretion 
in granting that motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the trial court correcting but refusing to set 
aside the default judgment should be upheld. The court was 
within its discretion in granting the judgment as a sanction for 
failure to appear, and in denying Beth Purdue's subsequent 
challenges to that judgment. The court acted properly in 
striking Beth Purdue from the judgment and in not allowing Beth 
Purdue to intervene in this suit through her motion to set aside 
as she has no ownership interest in the property in questionr and 
even if she did, she did not file for intervention in a timely 
manner. 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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DATED t h i s 
~if4r~ day of 1992 . 
Respectfully Submitted, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed 4 true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES to: John Purdue, Appellant, 
1177 East JSputh Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 on this ^ > ^ 
day of 3£ffi-\ , 1992, postage prepaid. 
(a: and c: purdue.brf [em92]) 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judg-
ments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative 
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if 
any, as the court orders- During the pendency of an 
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the 
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereaf-
ter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court 
Co) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal rep-
resentative from a final judgment, order, or proceed-
ing for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discov-
ered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denomi-
nated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for 
any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by 
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the opera-
tion of the judgment The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality 
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an indepen* 
dent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief 
from a judgment 3hall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
BY: BRUCE PLENK, #2613 
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 1 5 1991 
JBALT/LAKfc CUUNT V / 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Doputy Clerk 
CAPITOL HILL NEIGHBORHOOD 
COMMUNITY COUNCIL, INC., 
a non-profit 
corporation, and KEITH & 
DEBBIE WIDDISON, 
Plaintiffs, 
VSe 
JOHN PURDUE, 
Defendant. 
* 
it 
it 
it 
it 
it 
it 
it 
it 
ORDER 
Civil No. 890902814 PR 
Judge Michael Murphy 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Correct Clerical Errors and Omissions 
and Beth Purdue's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion for a New 
Trial came on for hearing on April 22, 1991 before the Honorable 
Michael Murphy, judge of the above court. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Bruce Plenk of Utah Legal Services, Inc. Defendant 
was present and represented himself. The court heard argument 
from plaintiffs' counsel, from defendant and from Beth Purdue who 
appeared and represented herself. The court reviewed the file in 
this matter and now enters the following 
!>000^7 
ORDER 
1. Beth Purdue is not a party to this action. Her motion to 
set aside the default judgment entered January 31, 1991 against 
both Defendant John Purdue and against her as to her is granted 
to the extent that she is improperly named as a party to the 
proceedings. Her name shall be removed from all pleadings. As she 
is not a party, in all other respects the motion is denied. 
2. Plaintiff's motion is granted. The court will sign and 
enter the proposed Amended Default Certificate, Amended Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default Judgment removing Beth 
Purdue's name from the pleadings and making other technical and 
clerical corrections. To avoid any possible prejudice to Mrs. 
Purdue, these documents will be dated as of January 31, 1991, the 
date of entry of the original Default Certificate, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default Judgment. 
DATED this A5 ^  day of T^ yjjLy , 1991. 
—77= 
MICHAEL MURPI 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order to: John and Beth Purdue, 1177 East South 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 and to Box R, Sterling, UT 
84665, on this '^ day of ^f/flfijj 
postage prepaid. f~i of "WMM r «91» 
$#A//fast- ifn^t 
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